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ABSTRACT. This paper proposes a contribution to the domain of systems thinking skills. Empirical studies
have repeatedly shown surprising misperceptions and inabilities in subjects confronted with tasks involving
very simple stock and flow systems. Here it is proposed to represent these skills as implicit integration, by
which Polanyi modeled our ability to know. In this framework, Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ five stage model of
learning is used to construct three hypotheses concerning the learning of systems thinking and its importance
for learning from modeling and interaction with models. The tests elaborated by Ossimitz are adapted for this
purpose and some tasks are added, to serve in the experimental corroboration of the hypotheses. Since the
empirical work is currently under way, only few results can be presented; consequently the main contribution
is the conceptual construction of the hypotheses.
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Resumen. Este artículo propone una contribución al campo de las habilidades de pensamiento sistémico en el
ámbito de la dinámica de sistemas. Estudios empíricos mostraron que sujetos sin formación previa tienen
graves problemas para comprender el comportamiento de un sistema simple de una variable flujo y una de
estado. Aquí se propone que la integración implícita de Polanyi puede ser aplicada. Dentro de esta línea,
Dreyfus y Dreyfus desarrollaron un modelo de aprendizaje de habilidades en cinco fases; de este modelo se
derivan tres hipótesis acerca del aprendizaje de las habilidades de pensamiento sistémico y su importancia
para elaborar e interactuar con modelos. Las pruebas de Ossimitz son adaptadas para una evaluación empírica.
Esta corroboración esta en progreso, por lo cual es presente artículo se limita a la construcción conceptual.
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Introduction
System Dynamics was developed in order to help decision makers design better policies,
based upon an improved understanding of how structure generates behavior. From the outset, it was
thought that people’s understanding of the system – called mental model – is at the same time the
richest source for modeling and meant to change (improve) as a result of the modeling (Forrester,
1961). Later on it was also tried to foster learning by interacting with simulation models or games
rather than modeling, because modeling is more expensive than using a model (Maier and Grössler,
2000). Thus the connection between SD and making-learn became stronger. Also, SD is presented
as  possible  element  of  inquiry-learning  cycles  (Sterman,  2000).  However,  the  usual  SD
publications do not focus on the larger inquiry cycles but rather concentrate on the learning going
on during a modeling effort, like for example inside the group model building area (Vennix and
Rouwette, 2002).
SD helps  in  several  ways.  It  provides  a  language with  concepts  and a  representational
system which guide their user to look at situation in terms of stocks and flows, feedback loops,
delays, nonlinearities and borders (see Ossimitz, 2000): it is a language for systems thinking.  It
also  allows  articulate  models  to  be  simulated,  in  order  to  validate  them before  using  them to
fundament decisions: it is a method for coming to understand a system in a disciplined manner.  
Sadly, many studies indicate that adult humans are not intuitive systems thinkers. It has
been shown that people misperceive feedback (Sterman, 1989; Moxnes, 2000; Jensen and Brehmer,
2003;  Doyle  et  al.,  1998)  and  other  SD building like  those  involved  in  the  bathtub  dynamics
(Sweeney  and  Sterman,  2000;  Ossimitz,  2002)  and  especially  distinguishing  stocks  and  flows
(Ossimitz, 2002; Kainz and Ossimitz, 2002). However, SD helps evolving metal models (Doyle et
al.  1998) and system thinking leads to better  control  performance (Maani  and Maharaj,  2004).
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Better systems thinking skills would probably help to be a better systems dynamicist as much as
modeling skills are needed. 
It has to be suspected that the understanding of one system – a conscious mental model -  is
not the same kind of knowledge as system thinking, which is a skill; accordingly, learning about
one system will not be the same as learning to think systemically either. This article assumes that
the  two mentioned  cases  of  learning are  different  but  strongly connected,  as  suggested  by the
theory of logical types of learning (Bateson, 1979). Seen in this light, the studies mentioned above
and  briefly  presented  in  section  2  investigate  different  aspects  of  one  underlying  theme.  The
justification for this assumption is given in appendix 1.
Section  3  argues  that  system thinking  skills  are  well  captured  by  Polanyi’s  theory  of
implicit integration or tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1966; Neuberg, 1999). According to this theory the
perception  of  something  we  recognize  in  the  world  is  only  possible  due  to  the  unconscious
integration  of  uncountable  sensory  stimuli,  which  is  why  the  things  we  recognize  are  always
already  there,  and  any  conscious  knowledge  is  based  on  this  implicit  knowing.  This  has
consequences  for  how the transformation  of a beginner  into  an experienced  systems thinker  is
represented. Section 4 introduces a five stage model of learning based on Dreyfus (1986), which
has  been  brought  into  connection  with  implicit  integration  (Neuberg,  1999)  is  presented  to
conceptually model this progressive transformation.
Section  5 looks at  the  different  studies  through the  lens  of  criteria  derived from these
conceptual models. It appears that the systems thinking tests should be adapted in order to assess
the stage-wise construction of system thinking skills.  Empirical work in the domain of the first
issue is just under way and first elements are presented in appendix 2.  
At a secondary level, the influence of these skills on the modeling-for-learning process may
become measurable if studies that investigate mental models take into account the stage of their
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subjects. Third, the fact that in spite of the importance of modeling for learning, none of the studies
tested the learning effects of modeling, calls our attention.
Recent Studies Concerning Systems Thinking And Learning
Without any doubt, the concern for the quality of perception of systemic structures and
their mental use is not brand-new (for example Sterman, 1989); at the same time, the connection
between  system  dynamics  and  learning  has  been  a  subject  ever  since  “Industrial  Dynamics”
(Forrester, 1961; also Morecroft and Sterman, 1994). This paper tries to tie together the topics of
“learning in SD activities” and “systems thinking”; in recent years, several relevant studies have
been published en the SDR or the SD conference, but they seem to concentrate either on “systems
thinking” (specially perceiving) or on “learning”.
Doyle et al.  (1998) ask if working with a simulation of a complex system helps to bring
about changes in the subjects’ mental models. Their case is the Kondratiev economic cycle, built
into the Stratagem-2 simulator.  Their subjects were undergraduate students without prior exposure
to systemic education, who interacted with the simulator during five sessions of one hour each,
spread over two weeks. Although they could work together during simulation, the raw material was
collected  individually.  The  raw  materials  were  written  statements  produced  by subjects  at  the
beginning and the end of the session. These statements were analyzed as mental models, looking
for changes en detail (elements, links) and dynamic complexity (basically feedback loops). This
study found subjects to develop more complex mental models (larger models with more feedback
loops) but without challenging or changing the model boundary.
Moxnes (2004) investigated if subjects could use the interaction with a simulator to learn
not do over-exploit natural resources in the case of reindeer range management. His subjects were
graduate students initiating SD studies who had to realize 3 tries with a simulator in the least time
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possible; they had to work alone. The raw material was their behavior and performance, and mental
models  or  rules  were  inferred  in  order  to  explain  the  behavior.  He  finds  that  result  feedback
apparently did not lead to go beyond linear thinking, maybe because of the non-linearity involved.
Jensen and Brehmer (2003) asked whether subjects who have to manage a predator-prey population
would learn to stabilize the populations in the case of a simulation of foxes and rabbits (a model
with feedback loops and non-linearity). Subjects were undergraduate students who could interact
with the simulator during one hour (the article does not mention clearly if they worked alone or in
teams). The raw material was behavior and performance, but also verbalized reasoning (thinking
aloud). About half of the subjects succeeded, but many felt they could use more mathematics skills.
The successful groups’ reasoning went from closed-loop control to open-loop control. They found
that  especially  higher  system thinking  activities  had  a  positive  influence  on  performance,  and
groups that asked for the system’s structure before making their plans did achieve higher outcomes.
Sweeney and Sterman (2000) wanted to test stock-flow thinking: would their subjects be able to
come to grips with a task that demands relating the net flow into a stock with the stock’s changes?
The case was a bathtub and a bank account.  The subjects  were  graduate management students
beginning  SD  education.  They  ware  asked  to  respond  to  apparently  simple  questions  in  an
apparently simple format that would not demand higher mathematics skills. The result of the study
was that many subjects had substantial difficulties with performing the mental/graphical operations
required to properly relate flows and stocks.
Ossimitz (2002) took up the work of Sweeney and Sterman and elaborated a set of tests that
would help to distinguish stock-flow thinking problems from issues related with the representation.
His subjects were undergraduate students who performed even worse than Sweeney and Sterman’s.
Ossimitz concludes that a “fundamental aspect is the ability to grasp that in a stock-flow-context
the stock with one inflow and one outflow is increasing when the inflow is bigger than the outflow
(or the net flow is positive, to put it in another way). Some findings indicate that this might be a
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key criterion for discriminating between a stock-flow-thinker and a non-stock-flow-thinker”. In a
following investigation, Kainz and Ossimitz (2002) compared subjects’  performance before and
after a 90 minute crash-course on stocks and flows, finding a notable improvement.
Maani  and Maharaj  (2004) tried to find  out  about  if  and how systems thinking affects
complex decision making; they used a case of an imaginary “computech” firm where subjects have
to strive for revenue, profit and market share. Subjects were graduate students in a business school,
and had been previously gone through systems thinking education. They could work in teams with
asimulator during 2 hours. The raw material was their behavior and performance and the verbalized
reasoning.  The  material  was  coded  following  a  systems  thinking  level  scheme  and  a  task
understanding scheme (which is based on the “correct” understanding of the underlying model).  
Learning To Think And Act Systemically
The empirical investigations suggest that few adults are equipped with these thinking skills
without having passed through a SD or other systemic education: after all, SD was first proposed as
a remedy for the lack of these skills. Also, someone who received this kind of education should
have less of a hard time in becoming aware of the SD building blocks when confronted with a
system or situation.  
This means that there is a progression from beginner to expert, and the beginner uses a
different kind of knowledge as the expert. However, it is not clear what the domain of expertise is:
does  one  become  an  expert  systems  perceiver  (implicit  systems  thinker)  or  an  expert  systems
modeler (explicit systems thinker), or both?  As stated above, a better systems thinker will have
more chances to elaborate a helpful model. However, even the most expert modeler will have to
articulate his understanding and undergo formal quantification and validation. So it is assumed as
prudent  here  to  think that  becoming a system dynamicist  is  becoming an expert  modeler,  who
masters the modeling skills that prove helpful for elaborating explicit knowledge of a system, and
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at  the  same time becoming an expert  systems thinker  (perceiver).  However,  the  two bodies  of
knowledge are different as shown above.
We now have to focus on what changes as one transforms oneself into an expert. In order
not to duplicate the presented argument, the following discourse is limited to becoming an expert
modeler.  Does the expert  modeler  know more (of the same type of knowledge)  or differently?
Cognitive psychology has been used in SD in order to reflect on the question of knowledge and
learning and to fundament the interest for and research on mental models and their change due to
SD activities (Doyle and Ford, 1997). This orientation has generated studies about the change in
mental models – by definition aware - more than asking for skills.  In this paper, it is assumed that
indeed skills are a different kind of knowledge that usually will not appear in mental models: the
expert is thought to know differently.
Polanyi’s Model Of Implicit Integration
Polanyi’s work is proposed to devise an improved model for how a person comes to be
experienced and judge and act  intuitively.  Polanyi elaborated a model  of perceiving and acting
intelligently based on Gestalt psychology. The basic assumptions are that there is a subject in a
world. The external world does exist, and the subject has but his or her own body in order to know
this world. So in a way, I know the world through the changes that my encounters with it trigger in
my body:  electromagnetic  waves  hit  my eyes,  the  rods  and  cones  trigger  a  chain  of  nervous
activities up to the point where “I” see an old friend. I know my friend through all of these inner
processes.  My friend is a  distal term, and the parts of my body (nervous system included) that
worked due to the light waves hitting the retina constitute a proximal term. We perceive the world
attending from proximal terms to distal ones.  And our knowledge becomes apparent in these terms:
we can consciously know grace to our implicit knowing.
Our focal  awareness (of  the distal  term) is  directed on  what we perceive,  and  how we
perceive (the proximal term) is not in our awareness, it remains in a subsidiary awareness. We may
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direct our focal awareness towards our inner processes, but then they cease to be proximal and
become distal.  For  example,  a  musician  performing a  Paganini  piece  is  supposed  to  direct  his
attention  towards  the  music,  not  his  fingers,  and  if  he  redirects  his  attention  to  them,  his
performance will not be a good one.
Naturally, there are many sensory stimuli arriving at each moment, and the subject (each
animal) has to steer himself (itself), that is: his movements, in an ever changing and moving world.
So there is a need for integration, in order to attend to the most important items.  This is done for us
by the nervous system without the need for or even the possibility of conscious control.  So it is
that  when I suddenly am aware of my friend’s  presence,  he is  already there;  I do not  need to
transform the sensory stimuli into this conclusion consciously, the integration is implicit from the
conscious subject’s point of view. Interestingly, I could not choose not to recognize my friend.  It
has been experimentally shown that optical illusions persist even though a subject deliberately tries
not to fall victim of them (Neuweg, 1999: 170). The subject can choose to doubt his perception, but
then the perception – the implicit integration- has already been produced. If for example, one puts
on eyeglasses  that  invert  the  optical  image, one can learn to perform usual  activities  (like car-
driving) within a couple of days; however, this does not mean that the eyes invert  the inverted
image,  but  that  the  rest  of  the  nervous  system adapts  so  that  the  other  relevant  parts  operate
together with the inverted image: it adapts its way to integrate. It was not reflection that brought
about the re-integration, but pragmatic attempts to keep on doing usual things of life. Remarkably,
subjects tend to forget that they see everything in a inverted manner unless they are asked: the
question changes the attending through your eyes to attending to them.  
This model seems well harmonic with recent findings about the brain and its self (Llinas,
2004), that show how the brain organizes complexes of perception (and also of action) in so-called
fixed action patterns in order to reduce computational overhead. Llinas believes that the brain’s
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function is to help the organism move (act) successfully in a ever more dynamic world by making
accurate predictions,  and that  intelligence comes from having to move your body in the world
(reflection is but a tool, not an end in itself).
 
As the example of the inverted image shows, the implicit integration can be learned, and
certainly has to be learned from the earliest age on. This goes on all the time. According to Polanyi,
our awareness is not only directed outwards in each moment, it also moves on outwards as we
learn:  as a beginner,  a car  driver will  focus on, say, not directing his  car off  the road and not
becoming too fast or slow; he feels the texture of the steering wheel on his hands: he attends from
his hands to the steering wheel.  The experienced car driver will feel the road’s texture through the
car, to him the car is like a part of his body.  The same happens with writing on paper with a pencil
(you can feel the texture of the paper) and when you walk down the street, you experience your feet
hitting the road (and not your socks).   We literally  incorporate our tools and other entities  we
encounter in the world.
At  the  side  of  perception,  we develop  connoisseurship –  a  capability  to  intuitively (or
implicitly) recognize patterns or situations that require the integration of many elements from the
sensory stimuli to the corresponding neural centers,  part  of which cannot be precisely stated or
related to each other.  Examples are judging the quality of vine or perfume.
At the side of action, we develop skills – the capability to perform complexes of action that
require a great deal of implicit integration from the respective neuronal centers to the motor units.
One possible example is language, even though it has to be reminded that language also requires
connoisseurship.
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The Use Of Polanyi’s Work For System Dynamics
An expert SD practitioner will probably be able to “see” feedback loops and other building
blocks in a way similar to the inverted-image case: looking at a case like the bathtub (Seewey and
Sterman, 2002, Ossimitz, 2002) or the lichen/grazing case (Moxnes, 2004), he will intuitively see
systemic structures: he is a connoisseur.  He will also intuitively know what to do in order to come
to grips with the situation, knowing when to rely on qualitative modeling and when to simulate
(and how to): he has the skills, he knows the systemic language with all its symbols (Ossimitz) and
meanings.
The individuals typically tested in experimental situations (Seewey and Sterman, Doyle et
al., 1998; Moxnes, 2000, Maani and Maharaj, 2004; 2004; Jensen and Brehmer, 2003, Ossimitz,
2002) seem to be rather like newborn babies in systemic terms: they do not have the connoisseur’s
seeing capability, nor the systemic representation skills. They may have gone through mathematics
and sciences education at different levels, but apparently there are some thinks to be learned (in
order to become a connoisseur) that are not part of this education. If you have learned German as
your mother language, you do not distinguish the separate words your Danish neighbor pronounces,
unless you take a Danish course. It becomes understandable how a person who manages his bathtub
and bank account (Sweeney and Sterman, 2000) does not manage to perform a task that seems to be
the  same  one  in  more  abstract  terms:  if  managing  the  bathtub  is  a  skillful  activity  and  the
capabilities  are  proximal  (implicit),  but  the  bathtub  experiment  brings  the  skill  into  focal
consciousness as distal  term, then the conclusion can only be that human adults are not skillful
connoisseurs of systemic-dynamic situations unless they become one by learning.
So the question faced by SD and other systemic practitioners is: how can we help them
becoming connoisseurs and skillful?  
11 Working Paper Series (WPS). Año 3, Nº 5, 2005 
Following Polanyi, we have to learn the proximal term, the elements and subsidiaries that
have to do the implicit integration as act of subsidiary awareness. This can be done in different
ways:
• the  learner  can  focus  on  the  distal  term,  leaving  the  elements  needed  to  produce  the
integration in the implicit, do not become articulate;
• the learner can focus on the proximal term, trying to make explicit the subsidiary elements
and their way of integration.
If the learner can draw on previous personal experience, it can be useful to use explicit learning,
but  always  in  combination  with  activities  that  use  implicit  learning.  Especially,  it  becomes
important to have a master whom to observe and imitate. This allows the learner to dwell inside the
master’s mind, thereby producing in him the needed implicit integration. The learner will have to
trust  his master,  and be prepared to execute assigned tasks even though he will  not be able to
understand them: only by doing so will the have the personal experience required for focusing on
the proximal term.  
Learning should iterate between the implicit and the explicit mode: the proximal term is a-
critical  (for  un-articulate)  and  many  times,  focusing  on  it  me  help  to  improve  the  process.
Afterwards, the improved elements have to be driven back into the realm of the implicit, where it
operates as proximal term.  This process is like a spiral:
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a diffuse whole
elements
articulate whole
elaborate whole
analysis
(extraction of
elements)
explicit
integration
implicit
reintegration
Fig. 1 – learning as a spiral of integrations (translated from Neuweg, 1999:255)
Dreyfus And Dreyfus
While Polanyi’s model allows us to understand the meaning of the empirical findings in a
way that points at a specific need to foster connoisseurship and skill in a way that honors the need
for implicit learning in combination with analysis, it does not show how the learner progressively
transforms himself into an experienced or expert modeler. As system dynamicists, we may think of
the learning as a delay: the inflow are beginners, the outflow skilled connoisseurs. The length of
the delay depends of didactical and personal factors, but these being equal amongst learners, it is a
pipeline delay: it takes time to transform oneself from a beginner into an expert.  The question rises
if this highly aggregate view is appropriate?  Does one turn from beginner into expert in one single
step?
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) model of turning from a beginner into an expert suggests that
there are indeed several  phases  one runs through. Since each of the phases is  characterized by
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different  and identifiable  aspects  of  the learner,  this  model  can  be useful  to  design a stepwise
learning approach for systems thinking and understanding.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus developed a model for the training of aircraft pilots.  It tries to make
clear  how  intuitive  judgment  and  action  –  knowing  and  acting  without  previous  conscious
deliberation- can be developed out of a beginner state where the learner cannot do much but follow
previously defined rules.  The model has the following phases:
Beginner
The beginner does not have personal experience in the field and depends on the availability
of  general  (context-free)  attributes and  rules attached  to these  attributes.  His  attention  will  be
absorbed by the analytic search for the attributes and the execution of the rules.
The typical learning activities are instruction, presentation, simple and reduced exercises.
The beginner modeler will typically study a textbook, say “Business Dynamics” (Sterman,
2000)  internalize  what  the  SD building  blocks  are  (feedback  loops,  stocks  and  flows,  delays,
nonlinearities and boundaries), and strive to apply the rules extracted from lecture or/and example
models in order to do the exercises or resolve the challenges.
Advanced beginner
As he comes to resolve more situations,  the learner  elaborates  a growing set  of known
situations and comparison between them starts to crystallize situation-specific and holistic aspects
(rather than formally defined, partial and context-free attributes).  These aspects are connected with
directives (rather than rules).
The typical learning activities are aimed at fostering reflection on the similarities between
situations.
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The advanced beginner modeler will now try to attack validation tasks, which will demand
some interaction with a more experienced modeler or teaching personnel.  He may be interested in
“best practices” material which helps him to build up his directives.
Competent
Now the learner deals with many details (attributes and aspects) and he starts to develop his
own perspective which allows him to order and set priorities and weights; he starts to set goals and
plan  ahead,  taking  into  account  the  situational  context  and  also  developing  an  emotional
involvement with his knowledge (since it is not based on externally defined rules and directives).
Typical learning activities are mainly simple case studies.
The competent modeler will work on small modeling projects in order to resolve a given
case, maybe as part of the book’s challenges.
Proficient competent
Now the learner has come to perceive the situation as a whole and in an intuitive (implicit)
manner.  He does not need to take it  apart  into  attributes  in order  to know “what  the case  is”.
However, since there are more possible action strategies than situations, he still has to consciously
reflect upon what to do.
Typical learning activities include more complex case studies and participation in real work
situations.
The proficient competent modeler will resolve real modeling tasks and even if he keeps the
book like a reference manual, he will only use it to recall how some things are done.  He is able to
“see” feedback loops and the like –maybe even archetypes- in an effortless manner.
Expert
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Finally, the learner has learned to intuitively know what he has to do: “an expert does not
have to reflect; he knows” (Frank Lloyd Wright).
The expert  modeler may be looked for by some consulting company, since he is able to model
productively.  He knows when to model qualitatively and when to use quantitative modeling in the
situation he meets.
The following table (adapted from Neuberg, 1999, p. 311) summarizes the phases:
Beginner Advanced
beginner
Competent Proficient Expert
Elements taken
into account
context-free context-free
and situational
context-free
and situational
context-free
and situational
context-free
and situational
Sense for what
is relevant
no no consciously
elaborated
immediate
(implicit)
immediate
Perception of
situation as a
whole
analytical analytical analytical holistic holistic
Selection of
action
following rules interpreting
rules and
directives
extensive
planning
limited
planning
intuitive
On his way, our modeler will have mastered many –progressively more demanding- leaning
1 situations and he finished a learning 2 itinerary that made him become the expert he now is.  
Using The Model For System Dynamics
We now turn back to the full question of becoming a system dynamicist, involving skillful
systems thinking and modeling.
It is not clear how much time and effort it takes to develop from one level to the next, but
most  people who have served as subjects  in the reported studies  (Moxnes,  2000; Sweeney and
Sterman, 2000; Ossimitz, 2002) were beginners, and most active workers in the SD community are
proficient competent or experts.  If so, what should be expected from test subjects is no more than
skills that all of us embody implicitly (for example managing not to flood your house just because
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you wanted to take a bath); being able to avoid hot-cold oscillations in the shower, as well as more
complex and “systems”-specific tasks would remain the domain for more advanced learners.
Of  cause,  it  is  a  rather  crude  simplification  to  consider  that  the  learner(s)  in  phase
“beginner” remain beginners until the day the flow into the “advanced beginner” level; we know
that each of the learning experiences triggers a small and progressive transformation, and that the
flow from one level to the next is going on all the time. Anyway, it takes some time to go through
what  we  distinguish  as  being  a  beginner,  and  some  day  the  learner  is  considered  “advanced
beginner”.
We may thus represent a class of system dynamics students in the following way:
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BEGINNERS
ADVANCED
BEGINNERS
COMPETENT
PROF ICIENT
EXPERT
start
step1
step2
step3
step4
death
neccessary time
for step 1
neccessary time
for step 2
neccessary time
for step 3
neccessary time
for step 4
rest o f the ir lives
Fig. 2 A model of turning from beginner into expert modeler
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In this model, the time it takes to advance from one stage to the following one appears to be
constant and not dependent from any variable recognized as part of the system. However, we have
said  that  system thinking skills  may influence  the  becoming of  a  good modeler.  For  example,
Ossimitz (2002) concludes that a “fundamental aspect is the ability to grasp that in a stock-flow-
context the stock with one inflow and one outflow is increasing when the inflow is bigger than the
outflow (or the net flow is positive, to put it in another way). Some findings indicate that this might
be a key criterion for discriminating between a stock-flow-thinker and a non-stockflow-thinker”. If
this specific skill act as enabler, say for turning from beginner into advanced beginner, the chain for
systems thinking learning would interact with the one in the above model, and the “necessary time”
would change.  
This  calls  for  work on the relationship  between specific  system thinking skills  and the
specific  needs at  the respective  stages in the learning chain.  However,  this  must  wait  until  the
usefulness of this stage-model is established, which has still to be done.
Looking At Recent Studies From This Viewpoint
Each of the initially synthesized, recently published studies is somehow related to the issue of
thinking, knowing and learning, even though in different ways. We will now look at them from the
viewpoint  of  Polanyi’s  model  of  knowing  and  Dreyfus  and  Dreyfus’  model  of  learning.  The
comparison is based on the following items: 
• TSU: type of subjects used (according to the learning model used here)
1. beginner, 
2. advanced, 
3. competent, 
4. proficient, 
5. expert;
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• CPS: clues provided according to subjects
1. none
2. attributes and rules; 
3. aspects and directives; 
4. objective;
• INT: intentionality:
1. teaching or 
2. experimentation/research;
• CLF: competencies looked for
1. control a system, 
2. system thinking;
• CLLF: competence level looked for 
1. none
2. beginner, 
3. advanced, 
4. competent, 
5. proficient, 
6. expert;
• LRC: learning required for the competencies:
1. n/a
2. improve mental model of system, 
3. improve decision policies (learning I); 
4. improve system thinking skills (learning II);
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5.  improve the way complex situations are approached (learning II)
• SDAS: system dynamics action strategy
1. model
2. simulate
3. implicit integration
• AS: assessment approach:
1. self-reports, 
2. attitudes, 
3. inference based upon behavior, 
4. mental models from narrative, 
5. mental models from cognitive mapping;
Study TSU CPS INT CLF CLLF LRC SDAS AS
Doyle 1 1 2 1 1 1, 2 2 4
Moxnes 1 1 2 1 1 2 (1) 2 3
Jensen  and
Brehmer
1 1 2 1 1 2 (1) 2 3
Sweeney  and
Sterman
1 1 2 2 1 n/a 3 3
Ossimitz 1 1 2 2 1 n/a 3 2
Maani  and
Maharaj
3 1 2 1, 2 1 1, 2, 4 1 3, 4
Besides from remarking that many of the possible combinations have not been used by the
studies used here, we mainly see that,
• although subjects almost always were beginners in the field of systems thinking, the studies
expected them to be (naturally?) skillful, so to say: experts;
• according to this expectation, no clues were provided for beginners;
• the majority of the studies used a rather short time horizon; none of the studies looked at
the learning of systems thinking skills;
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• the subjects had either to know or to learn from interacting with a simulation; modeling
was not used as learning strategy;
• the focus is usually set on learning I;
• there is diversity as for assessment approaches.
It is argued here that studies on the process of learning of systems thinking skills are needed,
and it is hypothesized that the proposed model of learning is useful for this purpose.  If the stage-
model of learning to think systemically is useful, then subjects who are beginners and receive help
in form of attributes and rules should outperform other  beginners without this help.  Kainz and
Ossimitz (2002) gave their subjects a 90 minute presentation of stocks and flows where we find a
series of items like examples, attributes and some properties, but the presentation does not contain
rules comparable to those that underlie the scoring of the test tasks (like “When the inflow exceeds
the outflow, the stock is rising”).  It would be important to know how subjects would perform if the
help given includes these rules.  It would also be relevant to assess how much experience (tasks) it
takes until they reach experts’ performance.
There are three hypotheses to be corroborated:
1. if  beginners  need  explicit  and context-free  attributes  and  rules,  then  the  first  series  of
(adapted) tests should detect superior performance of the subjects.  
2. if the beginner stage is a necessary phase in order to become an advanced beginner, then
the subjects  who participated in the first  phase should outperform other subjects  in the
second series of tasks.
3. subjects who have arrived at the competent stage should be able to elaborate better mental
models from interacting with a simulator and from constructing a model.
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The tests can be adapted to validate these hypotheses.  The first task is the bathtub situation
taken from Sweeney and Sterman (2000) with constant flows, and it is presented together with the
relevant aspects and rules; rather that limiting time, the time taken by each subject is measured. The
other 4 tests  are presented without repeating the general  rules (that  apply to each of the tests);
instead, students can ask for a sheet where the rules are given and are also allowed to use personal
notes taken (which allows to detect who does not recall the rules) and the task sheet provides a
space  where  subjects  are  invited  to  optionally  state  the  rules  they  use.  Again,  each  subject’s
response time is taken.  
This investigation will reveal the dynamics of the use of explicit and context-free attributes and
rules.  The next step is to use the diversity of experiences (all 5 tests are different in some aspects)
in order to make subjects elaborate aspects and directives, followed by a new series of tests that
take the form of small modeling tasks, in which each subjects’ skills are challenged.  
Activities  to  test  the  first  hypothesis  are  currently  being  carried  out  with  undergraduate
business students in a Chilean university (during the fall semester from March 15 through June 24)
since only the fist test has been absolved so far, the results are only briefly presented in appendix 2
(but will be available by the conference date).
The second hypothesis has to be evaluated once there are subjects who qualify as “advanced
beginners”,  and will  take a comparison of one group of beginners  with the group of advanced
beginners.
The third hypothesis will become meaningful once the first two have passed the examination.
Again, its corroboration will require two groups consisting of subjects in different stages to realize
the same tasks, in order to compare their performance.
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Conclusion And Outlook
This paper set out to make a contribution to the domain of the learning of systems thinking
skills. This is justified because empirical studies consistently find subjects to lack these skills in a
sufficient proportion to raise concerns.  
The contribution consisted of the proposition to consider the basic acts of systems thinking
to be processes of implicit integration, based of the work of Michael Polanyi.  In the framework of
this model, the ability to perceive systemically is basically implicit (unconscious), but it can be
deliberately learned. This learning process has been suggested to consist of five stages, according
to  the  model  developed  by  Dreyfus  and  Dreyfus:  beginner,  advanced  beginner,  competent,
proficient and expert.  
Looking at recent studies on the subject of systems thinking and learning, it was found that
they did  not  make an  explicit  distinction  of  phases  of  learning;  rather  they detect  the  lack  of
systems thinking abilities in beginners.  
Three hypotheses have been derived from the learning model and it was argued that they
make sense in the current situation.  The tasks designed by Ossimitz (2002) have been adapted and
some more tests have been added in order to test the hypothesis.
The empirical research has just started, which is a limitation for the paper’s message, since
it has to be understood as the construction hypothesis, and not as their corroboration.  However,
this  construction  has  opened  an  interesting  possibility  for  the  domain  of  systems  thinking,  its
learning and its importance for becoming a good modeler or systems dynamicist.
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Appendix 1:  Systems thinking and knowledge about a system as complementary types  of
knowledge
It is not unusual for systems dynamicists to reflect upon learning, which is generally defined as
“generating  new behavior  or  the  internal  possibility  to  perform new behavior  as  a  product  of
experience” (Schunk, 1996).  For SD use, one can easily translate this into the following:
• “new behavior” refers to new policies and organizational structures;
• “new possibility to perform behavior” means new or improved mental models.
These are two forms of knowledge, and learning is the process of elaborating them.  Learning
is a process of change in the body of knowledge of someone.  It is work to be done by a learner,
and if we wish to help someone to learn, we can only provide him with helpful experiences. In this
sense,  Maier  and  Grössler  (2000:  139)  state  that  “learning  objectives  are  the  mediation  of
declarative  knowledge  (knowing  that)  as  well  as  procedural  knowledge  (knowing  how)  and
structural knowledge (knowing why). […] the meta-purposes of the simulation programs […] are to
help users understand the principles of the underlying system and to train users in controlling the
system”.   
These  goals  are  clearly  related  to  structural  knowledge  (understanding)  and  procedural
knowledge (controlling) in the context of one particular system.  It is thought that the interaction
with a modeling tool  or a simulation model  will  allow the users  to modify their  mental  model
and/or their skills.  According to Doyle and Ford (1998:17), “a mental model of a dynamic system
is  a  relatively  enduring  and  accessible,  but  limited,  internal  conceptual  representation  of  an
external  system  whose  structure  maintains  the  perceived  structure  of  that  system”  (emphasis
added).   As  it  is  articulated,  a  mental  model  is  declarative  knowledge  referring  to  some
combination of procedural and structural knowledge.
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What is knowledge that it can be declarative, procedural and structural?  Is the capability to
control a system - a skill– comparable to understanding?  Is procedural knowledge accessible in the
sense  of  a  subject  being  able  to  articulate  it  as  declarative  knowledge?  Does  mastering  one’s
bathtub draw on the same knowledge as resolving the bathtub tests, or is the declarative knowledge
used in reflecting on the test different?  And: what is known when one has structural or declarative
knowledge?  Is it the particular system under study or some more generic knowledge that enables to
better  study any such system? Doesn’t it  imply system thinking or system modeling procedural
knowledge?
Further, what kind of knowledge is meant when one says “system thinking”? Without being
able to discuss different  propositions here,  Maani  and Maharaj  (2004: 22) refer  to Richmond’s
(1997) definition: Dynamic thinking -> System-as-cause thinking ->Forest thinking -> Operational
thinking ->  Closed-loop thinking -> Quantitative  thinking ->  Scientific  thinking.  Thinking is  a
process that remains for its main part implicit, as our conscious reflections are only a small part of
all the cerebral activity going on.  This means that system thinking would be a set of skills rather
that declarative knowledge.
Ossimitz (2002) describes systemic thinking as:
• “Thinking in Interrelated Structures;
• Dynamic  Thinking,  which  means  a  thinking  which  is  not  restricted  to  grasping  just
snapshots of a situation, but takes into account evolution over time.
• Thinking in Models, which means that any systems thinker should be aware that he or she
is  always  dealing  with  a  model  of  a  complex  situation,  which  is  usually  massively
simplified compared with the "actual" situation.
• Systemic Action, which means the practical ability of steering systems”.
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The fact that Ossimitz refers to “thinking” is interpreted here as meaning that it is an implicit
process of knowing more than a conscious knowledge.  
Sweeney  and  Sterman  (2000:250)  define  systems  thinking  as  being  able  to  understand
“behavior that arises from the interaction of a system’s agents over time”, specifically:
• “understand how the behavior of a system arises from the interaction of its agents over time
(i.e., dynamic complexity);
• discover  and represent  feedback processes  (both positive and negative)  hypothesized to
underlie observed patterns of system behavior;
• identify stock and flow relationships;
• recognize delays and understand their impact;
• identify nonlinearities;
• recognize and challenge the boundaries of mental (and formal) models”.
This definition is somewhat closed to the SD community; it describes what the systems thinker
is  able  to  do:  he  comes  to  be  aware  of  feedback  loops,  stock-and-flow  relationships,  delays,
nonlinearities  and  model  boundaries.  These  are  the  building  blocks  of  the  system  dynamics
language.  It  is  not  clear  to  which  point  “recognize”  and  “identify”  refers  to  spontaneous
recognition/identification of these structures or if they have to be consciously looked for in order to
“discover” them (or some of both)
Anyway, systems thinking is always presented as a fluid form of knowledge that enables its
owner to perform better learning in front of new situations or systems.  In other words, these skills
are second order with respect to “understanding a given system X”.  In the terms of Bateson (1979),
there are several types of learning about a system.
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• Learning 0: coming to know how such or such a variable behaves. This takes a previously
existing model in which this variable makes sense. Many people will feel that this is not
really learning, but it is hard to deny that when your company’s profits where “high” last
year and now they are told they are “low”, you just came to know something new: you
learned.  Also,  reading in a SD textbook that  there is  something called “delay” may be
called learning 0.  Knowledge at this level would be rather declarative: one knows that
there are feedback loops, stocks and flows, delays, nonlinearities and boundaries.
• Learning 1: when confronted with an unknown system or situation, one has to generate a
way of dealing with it, calling upon and evolving one’s mental model of it.  This problem
solving performance is clearly a higher form of learning, and it produces the framework
inside which learning 0 can go on.  SD students will be frequently confronted to this kind
of situation, and it is our expectation that they will do better over time. Here, knowledge
would be rather procedural in that one knows how to find these building blocks in a given
situation (one knows how to access or articulate a model in terms of these building blocks).
The knowledge produced would be structural, as one now understands the studied situation
in terms of the same building blocks.
• Learning 2: the building of all the skills that help performing “learning 1” situations using
less resources. This may comprise knowing that such things like feedback loops or delays
may  exist,  and  certainly  knowing  how  to  model  step-by-step  and  also  being  able  to
intuitively  grasp  part  of  the  system’s  structure  or  behavioral  logic.  This  learning  of  a
context inside which the situations are alike is the explanation for the observed progresses
in learning 1 situations and thus it is called learning 2. The experienced or even expert
modeler is one who has passed through a learning 2 process. The knowledge belonging to
this  level  should  be  thought  of  as  highly  procedural,  and  its  articulation  would  be  a
declarative reproduction of what is implicitly known.
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• Learning 3: there is no guarantee that there can be only one context: there may be several
ones, and in some cases a subject would have to learn that a given learning 1 situation no
longer belongs to its usual context, but has to be classified as belonging to a new one.  This
learning of new contexts is called learning 3; since learning 2 gives us our typical way of
approaching  life  and  its  situation  (our  personality),  Bateson  thought  learning  3  to  be
exceptional and rather traumatic for the learner. It has to be suspected that turning from a
non-systemic thinker into a systemic thinker is an act of learning 3.  
According to Bateson, these types of learning go on at the same time: while working hard to
elaborate  a model  (learning 1),  the subject  also learns  at  level  2,  and this  is  how experienced
modelers transformed themselves from the beginners they once were into the experts they now are.
For example, when a person is prompted to make a statement with respect to some situation (like in
the study about mental model changes by Doyle et al., 1998), and the person switches from textual
expression to causal loop diagrams, there would have been learning at several levels.  Now the
person:
0. knows that CLD exist, 
1. is able to use it in order to resolve a situation;
2. has a new tool for resolving this type of situation, and maybe even
3. is turning into a systems thinker - according to Ossimitz (2000) the way we can
represent something influences the way we know and think about it.
The  conclusion  from  this  argument  is  that  what  studies  like  Sweeney  and  Sterman,
Ossimitz or Moxnes investigate is at a meta-level with respect to research on mental models. It
follows that the ability to perceive systemically is relevant for (prior to?) being able to develop a
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helpful  model,  be  it  qualitative  or  quantitative.  This  in  turn  leads  to  ask  if  the  traditional  SD
activities – modeling or interacting with a simulation – per se would need to be preceded by an
intervention in the systemic perception. According to Sweeney and Sterman (2000), this has been
the  reason  why  “Business  dynamics”  (Sterman,  2000)  offers  extensive  treatment  of  graphic
derivation  and integration.  However,  this  should  also  be  accounted  for  when  investigating  the
effectiveness of modeling or “flying” a simulator for learning about a system: what level of system
thinking competencies do the subjects have?
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Appendix 2: the study concerning the learning of systems thinking skills
This study consists of two phases. The first one applies a modified version of the tests used
by Ossimitz (2002) to undergraduate students of business administration in a Chilean university
(two groups corresponding to two different courses).  The first group is made up of 56 students and
it is about information systems development.  The second course is about system dynamics and has
20 students.
At the date of march, 18, only one week of courses has passed, so by the time this paper is
sent, it is too early to discuss the measured results and compare them with the ones observed by
Sweeney and Sterman (2000) and Ossimitz (2002).
Anyway, the first test revealed the following performances:
Task S+S O Sch 
(N=49)
ISD 
(N=34)
SD 
(N=15)
When  the  inflow exceeds  the  outflow,  the
stock is rising
0,87 0,42 0,55 0,41 0,87
When  the  outflow  exceeds  the  inflow,  the
stock is falling 
0,86 0,43 0,53 0,41 0,87
The stock should not show any discontinuous
jumps (it is piecewise continuous) 
0,96 0,64 0,55 0,38 0,93
The  peaks  and  troughs  of  the  stock  occur
when the net flow crosses zero
0,89 0,56 0,55 0,38 0,87
During each segment the net flow is constant
so the stock must rise (fall) linearly
0,84 0,38 0,55 0,38 0,87
The slope of the stock during each segment is
+/- 25 units/time period. 
0,73 0,26 0,29 0,03 0,87
The  quantity  added  to  (removed  from)  the
stock during each segment is 100 units, so the
stock  peaks  at  200  units  and  falls  to  a
minimum of 100 units.
0,68 0,27 0,31 0,03 0,93
0,83 0,42 0,47 0,28 0,90
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The discrepancy between the two groups is surprising, but not yet explained.  The tests will
continue over the next 4 weeks.
In phase 2, subjects will be prompted to model a sequence of simple situations; in each, the
subject has to make a prediction based on graphical integration / derivation.  The sequence is:
• one single positive feedback loop
• one single negative feedback loop
• each of Wolstenholme’s totally generic systemic archetypes (Wolstenholme, 2003, 2004),
which are all 4 combinations of two interacting feedback loops.
In each of the six tasks, the subject is confronted with a description made from a piece of text
and the graph showing the dynamic of one of the variables; the student’s task is to decide the type
of each identified variable, connect the variables and infer one target variable’s dynamic from the
model’s  structure  and  the  available  graph.   The  work  sheet  prompts  the  subject  to  draw  an
influence  diagram  (discriminating  between  stocks  and  rates;  see  Wolstenholme,  1990).   The
following figure (next page) is a translation of the first task from Spanish into English language. To
resolve this task, one must be able to tell if a given variable is a stock or a flow, and be able to infer
one  variable’s dynamic from the other one’s.
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You are the owner of a savings account that rearns a monthly interest corresponding to 2% of the account’s 
balance.  This means that the more money there is in your account, the more interests the bank will pay you 
in one month; and the more interests they pay you, the more money will be on your account.
Draw an influence diagram of this system:
Assume that for opening the account, the bank required you to deposit $10.000.  How will the system’s 
variables evolve over the first year?
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